no sw
The legal and security audit, through MCP
Recomputable facts, not legal advice: the inputs a qualified attorney starts from, never the conclusion.
Run by npm run next on 2026-10-25T21:38:10.924Z through the legal tool: every claim the author makes in this tree sent to the unit's forensic and verification doors, the unit's legal facts and rights beside this tree's licence module, the licence computed for this tree, the prior art of its theorems, due process over the claims, every security door the unit serves, and the tree's own security checks over its sources. Agents: get_legal_facts, get_rights, get_laws, compute_license, compute_prior_art, get_due_process, audit_security, audit_cloudflare, detect_traitors, get_conformance, get_fingerprint, audit_full_anti_fraud, get_guard_lessons, compute_forensics, verify_claim (free-by-default). Recomputable facts, not legal advice: the inputs a qualified attorney starts from, never the conclusion.
Claims: 41; verdicts ; violations 0; refusals 0
| Claim | Door | Verdict | Clean | Violations | Receipt | Note or refusal |
|---|
Rights and drift
The rights door was not reached.
Licence, prior art, due process
Licence computed for this tree: not reached. Prior art: not reached. Due process: not reached.
Security doors of the unit
| Door | Clean | Failed | Receipt | Honest |
|---|
This tree's security checks: 10 of 10
| Check | Passed | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| security:no-live-secret-literal | ✓ | no live Stripe key, webhook secret, AWS key or private key literal in the sources |
| security:tokens-compared-in-constant-time | ✓ | sameToken xors the bytes; no early exit on a mismatch |
| security:signature-compared-in-constant-time | ✓ | the Stripe signature is compared by sameHex, xor over every character |
| security:writes-need-a-role | ✓ | POST needs writer, DELETE needs admin; a reader is refused with the procedure |
| security:tenant-isolation | ✓ | the docket is addressed by tenant, never by a fixed name |
| security:webhook-verified-before-write | ✓ | a webhook is verified before anything is written; a refusal is answered 400 and recorded as a lead |
| security:keys-stay-in-the-worker | ✓ | the handler names no secret; the Worker alone reads env |
| security:cors-headers | ✓ | cross-origin reads allowed, preflight answered |
| security:timeouts-on-outbound | ✓ | every outbound fetch of the Worker carries a timeout |
| security:no-eval | ✓ | no eval, no Function constructor |